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I.  INTRODUCTION: THE MPCS AND THE MEASUREMENT OF SUCCESS 
I argue here that an important implicit theme of the Model Penal Code: 
Sentencing (MPCS) Draft (Draft) is what I will call modern tragic 
skepticism about empirical proof in legal reform. By an admittedly 
somewhat stretched reading, I will infer from the Draft both the negative 
and positive aspects of this tragic view of the world: (1) a sober recognition 
of the limited human knowledge about the effects of our laws that is offset 
(2) by a sensible, chastened, realistic commitment to a spirit of reasonable 
experimentation in an unknowable world.  
Thus, I am taking this occasion to reflect on our ambivalence about our 
ability to ever judge the success of legal reform. And I am doing so at a 
time when the empirical predicates of any such judgment are subject to the 
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daunting demands of modern social science. In the context of the MPCS, 
this ambivalence results in part from the impossibility of coherently 
formulating the consensus goals for a sentencing system. But it also results 
from our recognition that even assessing means or the measures for the 
means’ effect may prove quixotic if we aim to satisfy the standards of 
modern statistics. 
Although this is a contestable distinction, the MPCS Draft is a law 
reform document, not a policy design proposal. It rests on the American 
Law Institute (ALI)-venerated mixture of reliance on legal precedent (in 
the broad sense of legal tradition—not, of course, narrowly binding case 
law), consistency with jurisprudential principle, appeal to common sense 
fairness, respect for relative institutional competence, and general 
commitment to efficacy and economy. Thus, the Draft does not commit 
itself to the type of future empirical evaluation associated with “policy” 
programs designed by social science experts to achieve functionally 
specific goals within the legal system. 
A.  MPCS’ Commitment to Empirical Measurement  
Although a reform document, the Draft is substantially committed to 
empirical measurement in much of its design. For example, it calls for the 
forecasting of the financial and demographic effects of new sentencing 
laws and expresses some confidence that this is a rational and realistic 
exercise to impose on lawmakers.1 Additionally, in all the micro-level 
decisions that any penal and sentencing scheme makes, the Draft is deeply 
committed to that large, yet vague, body of programmatic thought called 
evidence-based practices.2 Moreover, the Draft’s fundamental emphasis on 
a version of retributivism3 does not preclude empirical measurement, since 
the notion of an empirical evaluation of a retributivist legal program is not 
oxymoronic. For example, to the extent that retributivist ideas should rest 
on common moral values, one can use survey data to test consistency with 
such values, as Paul Robinson has done in his important work on 
perceptions of ordinal measures of moral salience of crimes.4 Indeed, as I 
later suggest regarding the MPCS, another much simpler empirical test of 
the “success” of a retributivist program is its sheer duration or survival, 
that is, its ability to withstand political change rooted in moral 
disagreement.5 
 
                                                                                                                     
 1. See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 1.02 (Preliminary Draft No. 6, 2008). 
 2. Id. §§ 7.07B, 6B.09 cmt. d; MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING REPORT 30–32 (2003). 
 3. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 1.02(2)(a) (Preliminary Draft No. 6, 2008); MODEL 
PENAL CODE: SENTENCING REPORT, Reporter’s Introduction 35–41 (2003). 
 4. See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson & Robert Kurzban, Concordance and Conflict in Intuitions of 
Justice, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1829, 1832 & n.6 (2007). 
 5. Id. 
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Nevertheless, a comprehensive legal reform such as the Draft does not 
cast itself as a designed experiment, subjected to statistical verification, 
because it is much too vast and complex an undertaking and is too 
inflected with deontological value for such a test. Although there have 
been many critical reappraisals of the substantive criminal law parts of the 
Model Penal Code (MPC),6 as far I am aware, there have been no “policy 
evaluations” of its utilitarian achievements because the MPC was never 
conceived in terms for which such evaluation would be expected. And 
while the Draft’s promotion of sentencing-effect forecasting and evidence-
based decision-making reflects the MPCS’ noble utilitarian goals, these 
goals are a far cry from demanding or expecting formal social science 
verification of the operations of the system. 
B.  Examples of the MPCS’ Treatment of Specific Statistics  
It is precisely against this background that I observe a few important 
moments in the Commentary to the Draft that invoke fairly technical 
matters of empirical evaluation—and passionate, even defensive, 
emphasis. One moment concerns the debate over the efficacy of marginal 
discretionary parole judgments and whether they provide a marginally 
useful incentive to good behavior by prisoners.7 The other, larger one is 
about whether the contemporary shift towards greater determinacy in 
sentencing has contributed to the huge and much-derided increase in the 
American incarceration rate in recent years.8 I am not concerned with the 
validity of what the Commentary says on these subjects, although it makes 
a very convincing case. Rather, in this article I draw out the implications of 
these moments to ask how, if at all, we should evaluate the sentencing 
reform scheme for success or failure. I extend this inquiry into areas the 
MPCS does not directly address in any detail, but which are implicit in any 
discussion of sentencing reform—such as fiscal effects, political dynamics, 
and racial fairness. 
1.  The Commentary’s Treatment of Parole and Statistics 
On the first subject, the Commentary is subtly agnostic. It treats this 
question about parole release decisions against the background of the 
Draft’s major premise—the commitment to a version of determinate 
sentencing and especially, to the abolition of parole board discretionary 
                                                                                                                     
 6. In the major collections of essays appraising the MPC, the crime-definition parts of the 
Code (as opposed to the earlier sentencing provisions) receive normative reconsideration but are not 
subjected to any empirical study of their effects on crime or criminal justice. Richard G. Singer, 
Foreword, 19 RUTGERS L.J. 519, 519–20 (1988); see also Paul H. Robinson, Structuring Criminal 
Codes to Perform Their Function, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L REV. 1, 1–11 (2001). 
 7. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING, Reporter’s Introduction at 3–13 (Preliminary Draft 
No. 6, 2008). 
 8. Id. at 14–29. 
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release. The Draft, of course, calls for considerable control over the 
structure of this determinacy through a commission or guidelines approach, 
and it permits a small exception for judges to reappraise especially long 
sentences late in the duration of the original sentence.9 However, the 
Draft’s commitment to determinacy is clear. It concludes that the research 
offers no convincing evidence of any comparative advantage possessed by 
parole officials to judge rehabilitation or predict behavior.10 Those notions 
have set a baseline assumption against any delegation of authority to parole 
authorities or any faith in the utility of engineering or measuring 
rehabilitation late in imprisonment. In effect, the Draft places a huge 
burden of proof on any empirical argument to the contrary. But such a high 
bar is set because of what the Draft perceives to be very strong empirical 
evidence on one side of the question and because, in the Draft’s view, such 
discretion violates more deontological notions of proportionality and 
equity.11  
Thus, in the view of the Draft, the deck is stacked against the proposal 
for a small exception for inducing late-term good behavior and self-
improvement, as some otherwise sympathetic to the abolition of 
discretionary parole have proposed.12 The Commentary pays heed to the 
admonition of Norval Morris that predictions of post-release behavior can 
be pretty much set by pre-incarceration static factors, and that the incentive 
theory of discretionary release backfires because it simply invites feigning 
by manipulative prisoners.13 The Commentary does not explicitly commit 
itself to Morris’ skepticism, but it makes a clear, if implicit, decision about 
burden of proof.14  
Citing the strongest new study which supposedly finds some efficacy in 
these marginal incentive programs,15 the Commentary purports to refute 
this study on two key methodological grounds. First, the study’s numbers 
are dominated by the bizarre anomaly of the California parole system. 
Second, because revocation criteria vary widely among the states, the study 
cannot draw reliable conclusions about the relationship between parole 
incentive and good behavior.16 The Commentary concludes, almost 
                                                                                                                     
 9. Id. at 52–53. 
 10. Id. at 2. 
 11. Id. at 4–6. 
 12. See generally JOAN PETERSILIA, WHEN PRISONERS COME HOME: PAROLE AND PRISONER 
REENTRY (2003) (discussing the origins and evolution of modern parole). 
 13. NORVAL MORRIS, MACONOCHIE’S GENTLEMEN: THE STORY OF NORFOLK ISLAND &  THE 
ROOTS OF MODERN PRISON REFORM 183 (2002). 
 14. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING, Reporter’s Introduction 6 (Preliminary Draft No. 6, 
2008). 
 15. Connie Stivers Ireland & JoAnn Prause, Discretionary Parole Release: Length of 
Imprisonment, Percent of Sentence Served, and Recidivism, 28 J. CRIME &  JUST. 27, 27–50 (2005). 
 16. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING, Reporter’s Introduction 11–14 (Preliminary Draft No. 
6, 2008). 
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ominously, that “we should be wary of building the important components 
of a sentencing system, especially rules and policies that apply to large 
numbers of prisoners, upon an absence of knowledge.”17 
2.  The Commentary’s Treatment of Incarceration Rates and 
Statistics 
As for the larger question, Professor Reitz himself has taken great pains 
in recent years to argue vigorously against what he sees as a common 
perception that the guidelines or commission model has generally 
increased incarceration rates.18 He has offered studies indicating that most 
of the modern increase in incarceration has happened under old-fashioned 
indeterminate or unstructured schemes, and that more contemporary cross-
state comparisons do not support any inference that the guidelines schemes 
lead to incarceration rate increases.19 The Commentary augments that 
argument with increased detail and passion. It concedes the superficial 
logical appeal of the notion that determinacy increases prison populations 
and ascribes that appeal in part to the anomalous example of the federal 
system.20 But the Commentary casts doubt on that logic by noting that 
parole officials are actually very weak regulators of prison size:21 they are, 
after all, subject to political pressure and can only control the back-end, not 
the front-end.22 
More important, the Commentary amasses impressive statistics to show 
that, if anything, states that retained indeterminate sentencing and back-
door parole release well into the modern determinate era showed larger 
than average growth in prison populations.23 But it is the normative context 
in which the Commentary places these numbers that is most telling. The 
Commentary cautiously avoids taking a position in favor of reducing 
prison populations, and, indeed, even avoids attributing such a goal to the 
proponents of Sentencing Guidelines Parole Release Abolition (SGPRA) 
regimes, at least in any categorical sense.24 Rather, the Commentary 
suggests that a desire to relieve prison populations may have run parallel 
to the independent goals—presumably the limited retributivist and 
proportionality goals—of SGPRA, and that any legal system that overtly 
                                                                                                                     
 17. Id. at 14. 
 18. Kevin R. Reitz, Don’t Blame Determinacy: U.S. Incarceration Growth Has Been Driven 
by Other Forces, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1787, 1794 (2006). 
 19. Id. at 1798–1801. 
 20. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING, Reporter’s Introduction 14–15 (Preliminary Draft No. 
6, 2008). 
 21. Id. at 14–16. 
 22. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING REPORT, Reporter’s Introduction 64–65 (2003).  
 23. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING, Reporter’s Introduction 16–22 (Preliminary Draft No. 
6, 2008). 
 24. Id. at 23–29; MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING REPORT, Reporter’s Introduction 76–85 
(2003). 
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seeks to change the prison population in any direction can do so quite 
independently of its stances on determinacy and parole.25 
The Commentary not only eschews using statistics to prove the success 
of the move to determinacy—it even denies that any particular stance on 
prison population is necessarily the goal of any sentencing reform. It 
implies that anyone objecting to a sentencing reform proposal on the 
ground that, other things being equal, it increases the prison population 
cannot carry the necessary burden of proof. The Commentary thereby 
suggests that critics of SGPRA either wrongly assume increased 
populations are bad or wrongly ascribe to determinacy-advocates the goal 
of reducing populations.26 Therefore, the Commentary uses statistics solely 
to undermine the strength of that latter claim. There is a kind of deeper 
uncertainty in the Commentary at this point. It does not so much suggest 
that careful statistics can prove success, but rather suggests that careful 
statistics can sometimes disprove or at least cast grave doubt on 
suspiciously easy or confident claims of some particular effect. 
Before I discuss the implications of tragic skepticism for sentencing 
reform, I provide in Part II a background for this theme by drawing on the 
work of Franklin Zimring and Gordon Hawkins. I then illustrate in Part III 
how tragic skepticism has pervaded the analysis of programs at the center 
of the 1990s crime drop, emphasizing the work of Richard Rosenfield and 
his fellow scholars. Taking my analysis of tragic skepticism regarding the 
1990s crime drop, I connect my discussion back to the MPCS and the 
implications of multiple causation factors in Part IV. In Part V, I discuss 
the tentative speculation regarding the measurement of sentencing reform 
success, revisiting the moments of incarceration rates and parole among 
other issues. Finally, in Part VI, I propose duration as possible 
measurement for sentencing reform success. 
II.   THE BACKGROUND OF TRAGIC SKEPTICISM 
To elaborate this theme of tragic skepticism, I beg the reader’s 
indulgence as I engage in a two-stage diversion from the immediate focus 
on the MPCS—although, the connection back to the MPCS should soon be 
clear. The first stage involves the Commentary’s subtle reference to The 
Scale of Imprisonment, the magisterial 1991 work of Franklin Zimring and 
Gordon Hawkins.27 Because I believe this reference is very telling, I will 
extend my discussion of the work further than the Commentary does. The 
Commentary cites Zimring and Hawkins chiefly for a factual point about 
the wide variety of incarceration rates among the U.S. states and how that 
variety negates any easy inferences about national trends.28 Yet, the 
                                                                                                                     
 25. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING, Reporter’s Introduction 27–29 (Preliminary Draft No. 
6, 2008). 
 26. Id. at 23–29. 
 27. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING &  GORDON HAWKINS, THE SCALE OF IMPRISONMENT (1991). 
 28. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING, Reporter’s Introduction 18 (Preliminary Draft No. 6, 
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Commentary thereby teases those who know The Scale of Imprisonment 
about possible approval of the book’s major thesis (for which the technical 
point is relevant as supporting evidence). That major point is the very apex 
of empirical agnosticism because Zimring and Hawkins find no clear 
evidence of any causal link between any penal or sentencing policy and the 
rate of imprisonment in any polity.29 
Reviewing vast bodies of historical and empirical research, both 
domestic and international, Zimring and Hawkins draw very bracing 
inferences. One such inference is that a polity’s general jurisprudence of 
imprisonment rarely expresses anything very precise about desirable 
numbers of prisoners or the duration of sentences, which may be just as 
well, because implementations of penal systems seem to have little 
predictable effect on prison population.30 One reason for the absence of 
jurisprudential commitment to such numerical measures is that even in a 
somewhat controllable system, vast leeway to influence the numbers is 
delegated to all the actors in the system so that control lies beyond the role 
of abstract jurisprudence or legislated policy.31 In the United States, rough 
similarity of policy among the states is belied by vast differences in 
imprisonment rates, leading to the default conclusion that “social forces” 
are the explanation.32 
Zimring and Hawkins then posit, and strike down, various common 
hypotheses for explaining imprisonment rates.33 Perhaps most soberingly, 
crime rates seem to have little demonstrable relation to prison 
populations.34 The disconnects between the two are astonishing and well-
documented, as illustrated by the absence of any incarceration increase 
during the great American index crime spike in the 1960s.35 A  Zimring 
and Hawkins explain, “[A] fact of overriding importance is that 
imprisonment is not the statistically usual response to felony crime in the 
United States.”36 As for other possible explanations or even correlations, 
there is little solid support for the build-and-fill theory—whereby prisons 
tend to accept prisoners up to their capacity, nor its obverse—that penal 
                                                                                                                     
2008); see also MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING REPORT, Reporter’s Introduction 67 (2003). 
 29. ZIMRING &  HAWKINS, supra note 27, at xii, 122. 
 30. Id.  
 31. Id. at xii. 
 32. Id. at xii, 119–36. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 121–24. 
 35. Id. at 122, 126. 
 36. Id. at 124. Among the numerous reasons why this may be is that younger criminals in new 
crime waves do not always get sent to prison, and that legislative responses to crime waves may 
affect the theoretical length of sentences but not the likelihood of conviction or post-conviction 
imprisonment. Id. at 122–25. Zimring and Hawkins would probably agree that the latter effects 
sometimes occur through pressure to plead guilty generated by mandatory minimum sentences or 
rigid enhancements, but presumably they would also say that such effects are very diffuse and 
unpredictable. 
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policy seems to produce no more prisoners than can be accommodated by 
existing capacity.37 Nor can we clearly link prison populations to “lock-
them-up” politicking, because the public is rarely given an explicit choice 
to increase prison populations, and the time lag between tough penal policy 
and effects on prison population is often so long as to diffuse political 
pressure.38 
The reasons for skepticism continue: American geographic regions 
seem to be dominant correlates, but a region is not a jurisdiction with any 
distinct policies. Furthermore, some links for which a modicum of 
statistical evidence has emerged seem random, if not counter-intuitive. 
Thus, even policies that may be motivated specifically to reduce reliance 
on prison will sometimes increase imprisonment.39 Regimes of alternative 
sanctions often end up simply widening the net of criminal supervision and 
feeding more people into prisons; they serve not as replacements for 
prisons, but as pressure-release valves to enable the state to retain large 
prison censuses.40 And the seemingly neutral and uncontroversial goal of 
improving the flow of information within the criminal justice system may 
itself tend to increase incarceration because officials, when presented with 
more data about criminals, tend to incarcerate out of risk-aversion.41 
The overall problem is a vast entanglement of variables. For example, 
as Zimring and Hawkins note, the very political pressures that lead to 
prison construction may independently increase prosecutions so as to 
additionally increase prison populations.42 For Zimring and Hawkins, the 
modern boom in incarceration rate is a “compound mystery.”43 Having cast 
doubt on all explanations rooted in purposeful programs, they lament that 
“there is no simple set of social variables thought to be related to 
imprisonment that would explain the increase as a consequence of forces 
external to governmental criminal justice policy.”44 We are left with 
notions of national “trend” and “mood” that Zimring and Hawkins consider 
“nebulous” and even “illusory.”45 
Zimring and Hawkins, however, at least purport to be optimistic about 
the possibility of research that might yet meet their tough criteria.46 On the 
one hand, they call for large, broad, historical, and comparative studies that 
look at significant changes.47 Thus, they suggest that if the decades-long 
                                                                                                                     
 37. Id. at 76–78. 
 38. Id. at 125–30. 
 39. Id. at 185–86. 
 40. Id.  
 41. Id. at 173–74. 
 42. Id. at 173. 
 43. Id. at 175. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 176. 
 47. Id. 
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upward curve in imprisonment in the United States flattens out and 
reverses itself, we might then have a phenomenon of enough significance 
to yield insights.48 They also make more specific suggestions about 
enriching the factor analysis for such studies, such as including jails and 
civil commitment facilities in the analysis.49 Although their heart surely 
lies in their wish for controlled studies, they recognize that formally 
designed studies are improbable in the criminal justice setting. Therefore, 
they urge research that attends in details to “precursory circumstances” and 
specific program interventions in the hope that the deficiencies of 
observational studies can be mitigated.50 
Zimring and Hawkins surely recognize that their rigorous standards of 
research will challenge the patience of policymakers. Throughout the book, 
they emphasize the “academic” question of social science proof, but are 
sensitive to the policymakers’ demands and pleas. Writing almost two 
decades before the current MPCS Draft, and somewhat early in the 
campaign for SGPRA, they note the potential promise of sentencing 
commissions to control prison population and acknowledge that their study 
would be depressing for policymakers who hope to build population 
forecasting into the commission model.51 Somewhat vaguely, they suggest 
that the potential for error in forecasting can be somewhat diminished by 
“paying [some] attention to the social, political, and economic factors that 
influence imprisonment rates.”52 
Zimring and Hawkins’ overall theme is one of a wizened, almost world-
weary agnosticism. For them, comparing states with different 
imprisonment rates to infer differential explanatory causes, such as 
emphasis on incapacitation, or perceptions of the costs of crime, seems to 
lie beyond modern empirical powers.53 Under the social scientist’s gaze, 
the differences in rates do not square well with differences in the overtly 
proclaimed means or ends of jurisdictions or political leaders. Thus, 
Zimring and Hawkins explain: 
[I]t is much easier for conservatives to defend a presumptive 
imprisonment regime that does not exist and for liberals to 
attack it as if it did than it is for either party to conduct a 
principled debate within the statistical field of choice that 
exists for imprisonment policy in the United States.54 
 
                                                                                                                     
 48. Id. at 216–17. 
 49. Id.  
 50. Id. at 177, 216, 218–19. 
 51. Id. at 113. 
 52. Id. at 115. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 207. 
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Zimring and Hawkins therefore imply a very serious challenge for 
anyone hoping to conduct an assessment of the Draft, and they implicitly 
foretell the risk of political resistance to the MPCS, rooted in failure to 
heed the empirical cautionary tales they offer. 
III.   THE PARALLEL LESSON OF THE CRIME DROP 
Thus, if the Commentary’s citation of Zimring and Hawkins suggests 
that the MPCS has implicated the intellectual crisis of modern criminology 
in understanding the effects of penal policy, an analogy to another, closely 
related contemporary criminal justice issue might be helpful. It is one 
linked to the imprisonment question by a similar appearance of Zimring 
and Hawkins’ tragic skepticism. This is the great issue—or mystery—of 
the 1990s crime drop, part two of my diversion from the MPCS. Here I ask 
the reader’s indulgence for a second and more extended digression from 
the subject of the MPCS—before drawing the connection back in some 
detail. 
The downward spike in American crime in the 1990s naturally led 
criminologists to seek the causes of the downward trend. Criminologists 
also tried to accommodate the demands and respect of city officials, for 
whom the rarefied rigors of academic research operated too slowly to fit 
the officials’ needs. The first round of research revealed social scientists’ 
recognition of the limits of empirical evaluation of criminal justice 
program success.55 
Even if sentencing reform goals are more contestable and 
heterogeneous than the goal of a straightforward policing strategy, the 
problem of lesson-drawing may be very similar, because the challenge of 
social scientists to help lawmakers draw constructive lessons from the 
crime drop parallels the potential lessons the social scientists may be asked 
about sentencing. 
As the big crime drop became undeniable, public and political debate 
began to focus on the potential efficacy of certain new policing and 
prosecutorial practices, especially those implemented in New York City.56 
But criminologists generally preferred to point to independent, and 
sometimes mysterious, changes in drug markets or the national economy or 
to lagged birthrate reductions in certain demographic groups.57 Certainly, 
the first round of academic assessments of the crime drop concentrated on 
                                                                                                                     
 55. See generally THE CRIME DROP IN AMERICA (Alfred Blumstein & Joel Wallman eds., 
2000) (discussing increased prison populations and the crime drop in America). 
 56. See John E. Eck & Edward R. Maguire, Have Changes in Policing Reduced Violent 
Crime?: An Assessment of the Evidence, in THE CRIME DROP IN AMERICA, supra note 55, at 207; 
William Spelman, The Limited Importance of Prison Expansion, in THE CRIME DROP IN AMERICA, 
supra, at 97. 
 57. Robert Weisberg, Meeting Consumer Demand in Modern Criminology, 4 CRIMINOLOGY 
&  PUB. POL’Y 471, 472 (2005). 
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such factors, along with mass incarceration and increased police density. 58 
These last two factors, while attributable to government design, are 
nevertheless not very satisfying explanations; the former, which carries 
many types of costs, may only be an indirect result of other more deliberate 
programs, while the latter says little about constructive program design or 
social improvement. Most prominently, econometrician Steven Levitt 
weighed in with a modestly skeptical take on the numbers.59 He cast doubt 
on the relevance of new policing procedures but identified four factors that 
exhibited some causal potential: (1) the sheer increase in density of police 
personnel; (2) the demise of the crack-cocaine phenomenon; (3) the 
increase in incarceration; and, most controversially, (4) the legalization of 
abortion.60 
One very specific scholarly encounter illustrates the significance of this 
statistical debate. A group of criminologists led by Richard Rosenfeld 
undertook to evaluate the claims of success of the three major urban 
programs, Boston’s Operation Ceasefire, New York’s Compstat, and 
Richmond’s Project Exile.61 Many studies of recent programs had failed to 
do comparative analysis among sets of cities or sets of programs, nor had 
they taken account of enough possible determinants within particular cities. 
In the wake of the apparent success of Ceasefire, Compstat, and Exile, 
officials in other cities were under great pressure to imitate these programs 
and were authentically desperate for guidance and reassurance.62 
Rosenfeld and his fellow criminologists examine the homicide trends in 
Boston, New York, and Richmond by applying growth-curve analysis to 
data from the ninety-five largest United States cities, controlling for 
conditions known to be associated with violent crime rates.63 They 
conclude that New York’s homicide trend during the 1990s did not differ 
significantly from that of other large cities and, though Boston exhibited a 
sharper homicide drop than elsewhere, the small number of incidents in 
Boston precluded any useful conclusions.64 On the other hand, they find 
                                                                                                                     
 58. Steven D. Levitt, Understanding Why Crime Fell in the 1990s: Four Factors that Explain 
the Decline and Six that Do Not, 18 J. ECON. PERSP. 163, 163–64 (2004). 
 59. Id.  
 60. Id. 
 61. Richard Rosenfeld et al., Did Ceasefire, Compstat, and Exile Reduce Homicide?, 4 
CRIMINOLOGY &  PUB. POL’Y 419, 419 (2005). Ceasefire was Boston’s anti-firearm initiative; 
Compstat referred to a set of much-publicized New York police practices, including punishing low-
level “quality of life crimes” and using computer technology to quickly allocate police to high-
crime neighborhoods; Exile involved deploying the high federal sentences for drugs and firearm 
crimes and the enhanced resources of United States attorneys to attack urban crime. Id. at 422–24. 
 62. Ceasefire replications were adopted in a number of cities. Erin Dalton, Targeted Crime 
Reduction Efforts in Ten Communities—Lessons for the Project Safe Neighborhoods Initiative, 50 
U.S. ATT’YS BULL. 16, 17 (2002). The federal government has invested millions in attempting 
widespread replication of Exile. Id. at 16–25. 
 63. Rosenfeld et al., supra note 61, at 430. 
 64. Id. at 434–35. 
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that Richmond’s homicide reduction was indeed significant, thus 
suggesting that the tough policies under Project Exile may have had some 
effect.65 Concerned that criminologists had given police and public 
officials something of a free ride as they claimed credit for the 1990s crime 
drop, Rosenfield and his fellow criminologists proffer this paper “as a 
point of departure for ongoing evaluation” and therefore as an admonition 
to be skeptical of claims that could not at least pass the modest test they 
implemented here.66 In technical terms, they suggest that, as minimal basis 
for such claims, scholars should employ the kind of tests they use here, 
including piecewise strategy for estimating linear trends for successive 
subperiods and hierarchical generalized linear models for comparisons 
within and across units.67 
Rosenfeld’s group may have hoped to find evidence of the efficacy of 
these programs, but they expect local officials to be satisfied with, even 
grateful for, a study which casts doubt on that efficacy, and which finds 
some positive evidence only in a program that relies on aggressive federal 
intervention in what is really just a new packaging of old-fashioned 
punitive enforcement. In fact, the group seems somewhat ambivalent about 
the message they are delivering to the police chiefs and mayors of the 
world. Their confidence that they have significantly corrected the deficits 
of earlier studies is balanced with remarkable concessions about the 
modesty of this study. They disclaim having either the data or the methods 
to study “the three interventions per se,” and they admit that their own 
“inferences cannot be as strong as many program proponents or critics 
would like, but they should be preferred over the baseless success claims 
and counterclaims and handful of disparate empirical investigations that 
have characterized evaluations of the three policing initiatives to date.”68 
In effect, Rosenfeld’s group speaks, at one point, of burdens of proof.69 
They say that, at least where their research turns up no statistically 
significant evidence of incremental homicide reduction due to an 
intervention, burden of proof shifts to proponents of those interventions.70  
The Rosenfeld study immediately met vigorous opposition from 
sociologist Richard Berk.71 Berk bluntly argues that any such efforts to 
                                                                                                                     
 65. Id. at 436–38. 
 66. Id. at 440. 
 67. Id. at 430. 
 68. Id. at 422. 
 69. Id. at 438. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Richard A. Berk, Knowing When to Fold ‘Em: An Essay on Evaluating the Impact of 
Ceasefire, Compstat, and Exile, 4 CRIMINOLOGY &  PUB. POL’Y 451, 451 (2005). 
Although in this paper I do not discuss the general political science of risk analysis and cost-
benefit analysis, I note that my mention of burden of proof implicates the vast subject of these 
principles in regulatory policy. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, LAWS OF FEAR (2005) (reviewing 
the various forms of burden of proof placed on the use of scientific studies in guiding risk-
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draw conclusions from non-designed, observational studies are futile.72 In 
his view, even with a discrete variable like homicide to study, there are 
simply too many other variables to control, and even more fundamentally, 
it is too hard to determine what a stringent causal model can accomplish.73 
To illustrate, Berk lays out what he considers minimal criteria for testing 
the effect of the New York-style order-maintenance policing on homicide 
rates.74 He deliberately sets a simple model with a single intervention—
number of police officers assigned to order-maintenance policing—and a 
single response—homicide rate—that is a linear function of the 
intervention variable and a perturbation.75 He then dauntingly lays out what 
he argues as the absolutely necessary conditions for this experiment—that 
the perturbation be generated independently of the value or the level of the 
intervention; that all units in the study be affected in the same way by the 
intervention; and that the intervention value assigned to some other unit 
not affect how the subject unit responds.76 In addition to these technical 
requirements, Berk emphasizes the need for considerable institutional 
knowledge to ensure that the intervention is truly manipulable—i.e., that 
the number of officers assigned to order-maintenance policing is truly 
subject to direct control.77  
These factors are a mere sketch of the methodological demands Berk 
insists must apply to observational studies, and he ultimately concludes 
that available statistical tools under the current state of knowledge are 
simply inadequate to the task assumed by the Rosenfeld group.78 Berk 
admonishes his social science colleagues that the only good alternatives are 
carefully pre-designed, true randomized experiments.79 At most, he shows 
some tolerance for “quasi-experiments,” for example using “generalized 
regression-discontinuity design” relying on a “known deterministic 
                                                                                                                     
regulation under versions of the so-called “Precautionary Principle” ). Academics have generally 
been loath to apply the principles of risk-regulation to criminal law because these principles are 
difficult to adapt to the retributive basis for the criminal sanction. See Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil 
Sanctions: The Middleground Between Criminal and Civil Law, 101 YALE L. J. 1795, 1863 (1992) 
(urging caution in treating criminal law as a regulatory tool); Nancy Frank, From Criminal to Civil 
Penalties, 30 SOC. PROBS. 532 (1983) (framing criminal law as risk-regulation raises concerns about 
strict liability crimes). Nevertheless, some have argued that criminal justice policy is always at least 
implicitly involved in risk regulation and that risk analysis and cost-benefit analysis doctrines are an 
unavoidable component of criminal justice policy. Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, The Institutional 
Logic of Preventive Crime (Stan. Pub. Law Working Paper, No. 1272235, 2008), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1272235. 
 72. Berk, supra note 71, at 451. 
 73. Id. at 452–56. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 452. 
 76. Id. at 452–56. 
 77. Id. at 454. 
 78. Id. at 455, 58. 
 79. Id. at 459–61. 
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mechanism,” or, more weakly, estimating treatment effects without 
conventional causal models but treating confounders as nuisance 
variables.80 
In surrebuttal, Rosenfeld’s group argues that they needed to address 
only criterion of consistency, not causality.81 They insist they have drawn 
no causal inferences, and that even where they find consistency between 
their statistical analyses and the officials’ claims, it could have been 
produced by other factors.82 Thus, in effect, “the answers to the question[s] 
posed in [their] title . . . are, respectively, ‘hard to tell,’ ‘probably not,’ and 
‘maybe.’”83 
This research was published in the context of a lively debate among 
criminologists about the debt they owe to policymakers,84 a debate that can 
be situated in a larger set of cultural questions about the role of social 
science in American policymaking. Do academics impose overly rigorous 
and complex standards on government because they have an intellectual 
investment in grandiosity to disdain concrete solutions to evident social 
problems? Are academics invested in the persistence of high crime rates 
because the idea of American exceptionalism is itself an endlessly fertile 
subject for scholarly inquiry,85 or do academics suffer a political bias, a 
leftist refusal to credit American virtue to American power and know-how? 
Or is the problem something much more substantive or technical—a desire 
by social scientists to correct Americans’ failure to appreciate that in a 
criminal justice system already so severe, marginal changes are futile? Or, 
to return to the work of elite empiricists, might academics on the whole be 
right in adopting an attitude of tragic skepticism, as evidenced by 
Zimring’s new book on the subject?86 
In the Great American Crime Decline, Zimring offers the following 
lessons: The crime drop was anomalously large enough to be historically 
significant, and it was “real” in the sense that it was not an artifact of 
changes in reporting.87 Further, the crime drop took place without any 
change in the social fabric, “the population composition, economy, or 
ecology” of the city.88 Thus, policy change may have played a major causal 
                                                                                                                     
 80. Id. 
 81. Richard Rosenfeld et al., The Straw Man Bluff: Reply to Berk, 4 CRIMINOLOGY &  PUB. 
POL’Y 467, 467–68 (2005). 
 82. Id. at 468. 
 83. Id. at 469. 
 84. Weisberg, supra note 57, at 477.  
 85. Joan Petersilia, Policy Relevance and the Future of Criminology—The American Society 
of Criminology: 1990 Presidential Address, 29 CRIMINOLOGY 1, 1–3 (1991); Robert Weisberg, 
Values, Violence, and the Second Amendment: American Character, Constitutionalism, and Crime, 
39 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 9 (2002). 
 86. See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE GREAT AMERICAN CRIME DECLINE 195–207 (2007). 
 87. Id. at 196. 
 88. Id. at 143. 
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role.89 But in terms of both social economic factors and policy changes, the 
drop was clearly the result of a multiplicity of causes that cannot be 
disentangled with our current statistical tools. For example, says Zimring, 
Levitt’s inference about the role of abortion may be flawed because it does 
not account for the much wider sets of contexts in which the “wantedness” 
of children might be relevant to their future crime.90 As for policing 
practices, New York’s crime reduction was indeed anomalously large 
enough to suggest that Comstat-style policing probably played some role, 
but how much cannot be determined once we acknowledge the many 
components of police logistics.91 Thus, it remains a vexing and 
disappointing task to attempt to forecast the effect of any policy 
intervention because of the underlying problem of predicting or 
retroactively inferring anything at all. Indeed, Zimring notes that many of 
the factors that probably contributed to the mid-late 1990s drop were 
present and quite visible to the best criminologists a few years before the 
drop, but none predicted it.92 And finally, for Zimring, there is the sobering 
and chastening significance of Canada. Canada exhibited none of the 
policy changes undertaken in the United States and none of the social 
factors, save for one (the drop in the proportion of youth in the population), 
yet it experienced virtually the same crime drop in the same period.93 
Canada is a benign but challenging reminder of how little we know about 
the world.94 
IV.   SOME IMPLICATIONS OF TRAGIC SKEPTICISM FOR 
SENTENCING REFORM 
If the elites in the world of criminology lament how invisible the world 
of causation is, where does that leave law reformers called on to enact 
reforms like the MPCS, and academics who might be asked to opine on its 
chances of success? As I have suggested, in terms of policing practices, 
one possible inference from criminology is a very specific burden or 
standard of proof. By parallelism, perhaps the goal of lawyers and social 
scientists in assisting in sentencing reform should be to identify, 
encourage, and even laud programs that show any prospect of effectiveness 
and exhibit no measurable downside because that is the standard of proof 
under which police officials legitimately need to act.95 Perhaps the 
governing principle should be a kind of Hippocratic oath: it is worth taking 
                                                                                                                     
 89. Id. at 201. 
 90. Id. at 85–86. 
 91. Id. at 150–51. 
 92. Id. at 21–24. 
 93. Id. at 132–34.  
 94. Id. at 107–34. 
 95. See generally Weisberg, supra note 57 (discussing the studies performed by Rosenfeld 
and his fellow criminologists). 
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up a policy that does no measurable and little conceivable harm, and that is 
within the limits of econometric prediction, might be rebuttably presumed 
to do some good.96 
So should such a relaxed burden of proof apply to sentencing? 
Sentencing and corrections may be a harder and bigger matter than short-
term crime control, depending upon the level of generality at which a 
program is evaluated. Other things being equal, taking a chance on street-
level police practices is cheaper and more reversible than undertaking a 
more structural change in penal policy (although the latter category is far 
too heterogeneous for this generalization to take us very far). But should 
the burden of proof be different or should it be the same modest one, 
applied in a different context? If the burden of proof should be different, 
the role of social science in sentencing reform would be to admonish 
lawmakers about which programs—predicted or claimed—are at least not 
inconsistent with the data. Social science’s role would also encompass 
discerning which observed schemes are obviously doing worse than those 
in otherwise roughly similar jurisdictions and urging lawmakers to be 
reluctant to rely on forecasting which is not derived from designed or 
quasi-experimental studies. 
Before proceeding further about the social scientist’s relationship with 
lawmakers, a note about branches and levels of government is in order. 
This is a matter somewhat important in the policing studies, but hugely 
important in a sentencing reform like the MPCS, where questions of 
reallocation of power among legislators, judges, and quasi-executive 
branch officials (i.e., sentencing commissioners) play a major role. 
Disentangling the various factors that affect the performance of a 
sentencing system is of course the heart of the problem, but it is an 
especially interesting challenge when the possible causal forces are 
different government actors or branches of government, or different mixes 
thereof, and hence different potential audiences for research. If we return to 
the inferences made by Rosenfeld’s group about the programs in Boston, 
New York, and Richmond, 97 we see that small police-authorized practices 
do not work much to reduce homicide, whereas the one possible success 
story is driven at a higher level—legislative or high-level executive. But if 
we then compare crime-stopping to sentencing, where the latter is at least 
initially implemented at a higher or more visibly political level, the 
difference in the audience for research is important.  
It may make more sense to offer a more generous burden of proof to 
police officials than to legislators or high-level executives. Legislators, 
above all, find self-aggrandizing policy demagoguery all too attractive and 
the externalization of costs all too tempting. So perhaps even if researchers 
are inclined to encourage local police in sending their research messages 
                                                                                                                     
 96. Id. at 474. 
 97. Rosenfeld et al., supra note 81, at 424. 
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they should, in the face of legislative demand for research, adopt a more 
dourly debunking stance. At the same time, in helping to both evaluate and 
promote the MPCS, academics will face political and moral resistance 
from various lawmakers about the proper goals of reform, and even more 
confounded resistance when it comes to sufficiency of proof of outcomes 
relevant to those goals.  
The problem of multiple causation will always haunt such work. 
Indeed, in their crime-drop paper, Rosenfeld’s group concedes a limit of 
their study in that each of the three campaigns under review contains sub-
components whose differential effects cannot readily be tested. Might 
better sorting then improve the cost-benefit analysis? Even if so, some 
research should address the clusterings of components we see in these 
cities, although that research may have to come from political scientists 
rather than econometricians. 
But if de-clustering can be done in the context of the kinds of 
sentencing changes proposed by the MPCS, what costs and benefits might 
be noted? Can criminologists help prison officials perform productivity 
analyses, to deploy financial accountants to help cities do cost-attribution 
for sub-components? And can political science or sociology or other 
disciplines help us determine the risks of not-so-material costs? Do 
academics have the kind of intellectual imagination to help us identify truly 
risk-free campaigns? Of course these amorphous inquiries cannot produce 
precise answers, but they may be useful. Perhaps they can reassure 
policymakers that some experiments will be at least harmless and might 
yield somewhat measurable answers to the question of how to improve 
sentencing systems. 
V.  TENTATIVE SPECULATIONS ABOUT MEASURING SENTENCING 
REFORM SUCCESS 
With those admonitions in mind, what might happen if we gently 
extended the MPCS Draft’s commitment to empirical evaluation a few 
suggestive realms beyond the question of whether determinacy necessarily 
raises incarceration rates? The most obvious result might be even more 
modesty about what can be done in facing the unbelievable mazes of 
multiple and unknowable causations in sentencing schemes. But another 
result might be that we could imagine some lines of micro-research that 
will someday bear fruit, especially if we relax burdens of proof in the face 
of public exigency. Below I sketch some possibilities and some rough 
empirical observations about how we can thereby go through the “stages of 
grief” of tragic skepticism and emerge somewhat more optimistic about 
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A.  Incarceration Rates Redux 
The MPCS does not directly address the question of prison 
overcrowding and inhumane conditions as a problem in itself. 
Nevertheless, its deep commitment to cost-efficacy, its call for mechanisms 
to predict the incarceration effects of legal changes, and its clear concern 
about unnecessary prison expansion all obviously imply a concern for 
unjustified increases in incarceration rates. First, a bit more reflection on 
the incarceration rate is in order. To be blunt, the perceived hyper-
incarceration crisis in America has obviously been the major social and 
economic factor provoking calls for reform, especially where state budgets 
have hit the wall on prison expenditures, or where federal court rulings on 
the constitutionality of prison conditions leave states no choice. To put 
things as delicately as possible, no proponent of sentencing reform can 
deny that it is important to consider the implications of the reform for 
incarceration rates. But a more modest predicate point requires emphasis. 
Regardless of the goal of any sentencing reform in terms of incarceration 
rates, the possibility of even measuring success of some ends or means will 
be quixotic if empirical science cannot tease out causality with any 
confidence. This is the juncture at which Zimring and Hawkins’ book 
obviously demands that we exercise some harsh realism on this subject.98 
However, to return to the cautious claims in the Draft about the effects 
of parole release mechanisms, we might say that the adoption of SGPRA 
systems might well tend to have a downward pressure effect on 
incarceration rates.99 If we look at existing schemes in some states, SGPRA 
was indeed associated with an actual reduction rate in a few states in the 
late 1990s and a slowing of the rate of increase in others that had exhibited 
especially high growth rates.100 However, Professor Reitz himself is very 
                                                                                                                     
 98. See generally ZIMRING &  HAWKINS, supra note 27 (finding no clear links between 
incarceration rate and such factors as crime rate, public attitudes toward imprisonment, and national 
economic trends). 
For example, experience has hardly validated the utterly plausible projection that a strong new 
“Three Strikes” law would greatly increase the incarceration rate.Se  BRIAN BROWN &  GREG 
JOLIVETTE, CAL. LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, A PRIMER: THREE STRIKES: THE IMPACT AFTER 
MORE THAN A DECADE 15–16 (2005) (noting 1994 prediction that the law would add 100,000 
inmates to state prison in a decade proved wrong, in part because of prosecutorial discretion not to 
exercise the “Three Strikes” option). One speculation might be that the true effect of laws like 
“Three Strikes” and “Truth in Sentencing” may not be noticeable for several years, materializing 
only after the extended time served exceeds that which offenders would have served in the absence 
of such laws. 
 99. Thomas B. Marvell, Sentencing Guidelines and Prison Population Growth, 85 J. CRIM. L. 
&  CRIMINOLOGY 696, 707 (1995); Sean Nicholson-Crotty, The Impact of Sentencing Guidelines on 
State-Level Sanctions: An Analysis Over Time, 50 CRIME &  DELINQ. 395, 396 (2004); Jon Sorensen 
& Don Stemen, The Effect of State Sentencing Policies on Incarceration Rates, 48 CRIME &  
DELINQ. 456, 469 (2002). 
 100. See Reitz, supra note 18, at 1802. 
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agnostic about the causal direction of this inference, particularly in terms of 
the proportional significance of the choice of sentencing system in the mix 
of factors influencing incarceration rates.101  
A useful and suggestive way to ponder future possible inferences is a 
snapshot look at the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) annual report on 
incarceration figures, most recently Prisoners in 2007.102 Examination of 
the 2007 report reveals that within the last decade—an arbitrary time unit, 
but a decent stretch of time for a realistic assessment of change—the 
United States imprisonment rate increased at an average rate of about 2% 
per year.103 That means, overall, a 15% size increase against a 6.4% 
population increase.104 In 2007, the jump was 1.8%,105 so in some crude 
national sense, the country is “doing better” if we assume reduction in the 
incarceration rate is an uncontroversial good thing. Hewing closer to our 
modest burden of proof, at least we see no sign that the rate of increase in 
the prison population is itself increasing. Moreover, the states as a group 
grew at half the rate of the federal system, and given the bizarrely unusual 
legal situation of the federal system, that means that the real comparison is 
in the state figures—between 1.7% for the years 2000–2006 and 1.5% for 
2007.106 
Although these aggregated figures tell us nothing at all about the 
success of the great variety of sentencing schemes, I offer them to give a 
flavor of the statistics available. Naturally, we should look at individual 
states, and if we do so, we see that in terms of increase in incarceration 
rates in the last almost-decade: 
 
—The “worst” states, in descending order from highest rate on 
down, were: Kentucky, West Virginia, Alaska, Indiana, Florida, 
Virginia, Alabama, Louisiana, Colorado, and North Dakota.107  
 
—The “best” states, in ascending order from lowest on up were: 
New York, Texas, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Illinois, 
Oklahoma, Utah, Nevada, South Carolina, and Massachusetts, with 
California in twelfth place.108 
 
—In terms of regions, the “worst” to “best” order was: West, 
                                                                                                                     
 101. Id. at 1794–97. 
 102. HEATHER C. WEST &  WILLIAM J. SABOL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS BULLETIN : PRISONERS IN 2007 (2008), available at http://ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ 
p07.pdf. 
 103. Id. at 1. 
 104. Id.  
 105. Id.  
 106. Id. at 2. 
 107. Id. at 5. 
 108. Id.  
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South, Northwest, and Northeast,109 but a look at the states listed 
above suggests that any regional differences are crude.  
 
Watching which states move up and down on these lists may prove 
helpful, and a fair inference might be that the states in the second list are 
not currently doing anything especially counterproductive in terms of 
sentencing, while those in the first list should be in a “watch carefully” 
category. But, the crudity of these numbers and the vast mélange of 
variables that affect them obviously require us to withhold judgment, 
especially when we can only be very tepid in even suggesting that 
decarceration is a clear social good. 
A far less controversial goal of any sentencing scheme is to avoid or 
reduce the degree of overcrowding. As noted above, the MPCS does not 
directly consider the question of prison crowding and inhumane conditions, 
but its obvious worries about unwarranted increases in prison expansion 
and its calls for cost-efficacy measures are surely consistent with a concern 
over crowding issues. The numbers here are complex and arbitrary. States 
usually measure prison capacity by several parameters—the inmates 
assigned by rated capacity (by governmental directive), the operational 
capacity (by managerial judgment), and design capacity (by the 
architectural planners).110 Then, both BJS and the states select whatever is 
the highest and lowest among these three measures for each state. From 
these measures, the BJS rates state prison systems by the ratio of actual 
prisoners to the lowest and highest capacities.111 On this score, the BJS has 
only supplied aggregate national figures, but the story is not too dismal: In 
1995 the state prison population as a percent of highest and lowest capacity 
was 114%, and 125%, respectively, and in 2007 the percent of highest and 
lowest capacity was 96% and 113%, respectively.112 As for the distribution 
of these mild improvements, the BJS tells us that nineteen states in 2007 
were above their highest, but notably, that the federal system was an 
egregious 36% above capacity.113 Needless to say, even if the goal of 
reducing overcrowding is uncontroversial, these numbers are too broad and 
rough to tell us much about success, especially when another possible, but 
highly immeasurable test of this criterion looms—the possibility of federal 
court injunctive control of prisons when the overcrowding proves 
unconstitutional. Tracking federal litigation is not a very good measure of 
anything, but for at least one empirical datum we might note that the 
existence of a hugely interventionist injunction in California is not exactly 
a compliment to its penal system.114 
                                                                                                                     
 109. Id. at 18. 
 110. Id. at 6. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 7. 
 113. Id. 
 114. On the state of the California litigation, see Robert Weisberg, How Sentencing 
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B.  The Crime-Rate Effects  
More ambitiously, if we treat sentencing and corrections as parts of a 
holistic criminal justice system, and if we assume that the purpose of 
criminal justice is to reduce crime, then the crime rates “produced” by the 
sentencing system would be the best success measure. The MPCS Draft 
stays well clear of any commitment to reduce crime rates through 
sentencing reform, but the drafters surely would consider time-correlated 
reductions in crime a potential validation of any change in sentencing law, 
and a time-correlated increase in crime a very bad sign of the social utility 
of the MPCS. But any hope of drawing sound causal inferences in this area 
widely outpaces our ability. For one thing, as discussed above, there is the 
uncertain condition of our econometric arts in explaining changes in crime 
rates, evidenced by the great division among authority in explaining the 
great crime rate decline of the 1990s.115 Second, to the extent that changes 
in sentencing affect crime rates, a key mediator of those changes (although 
far from the only one) will be the marginal incapacitative effects of any 
alteration or change in the size or demographics of the prison population. 
The MPCS model’s premises about smarter evidence-based 
incarceration decisions suggest that more rationally selective incapacitation 
can reduce crime and possibly also reduce incarceration. But the deeper 
problem is that the more intuitively plausible notion—that increasing 
incarceration and therefore incapacitation reduces crime—is itself an 
empirically uncertain matter.116 To return to the 1990s crime drop, prolific 
recent research has produced mixed and equivocal findings and 
speculations about the up-spiking incarceration rate’s role in the down-
spiking crime rate.117 
                                                                                                                     
Commissions Turned Out To Be a Good Idea, 12 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 179, 222–29 (2007). 
 115. See supra Part III. 
116. Empirical conclusions about the relationship between prison population increases and 
crime rates are difficult to draw. As pointed out by Judith Greene and Vincent Schiraldi:  
[D]uring the 1990’s, Texas added more prisoners to its prison system (98,081) 
than New York’s entire prison population (73,233) by some 24,848 
prisoners. . . . While Texas had the fastest growing prison system in the country 
during the 1990’s, New York had the third slowest growing prison population in 
the U.S. Over all, during the 1990’s, Texas added five times as many prisoners as 
New York did (18,001). Yet from 1990 to 1998, the decline in New York’s crime 
rate was 26 percent greater than the drop in crime in Texas. Texas’ 1999 
incarceration rate (1,014 per 100,000) was 77 percent higher than New York’s 
(574 per 100,000), yet Texas’ 1998 crime rate (5,111 per 100,000) was 42 percent 
higher than New York’s (3,588 per 100,000). In 1998, Texas’ murder rate was 25 
percent higher than New York State’s rate. 
JUDITH GREENE &  V INCENT SCHIRALDI, JUST. POL’Y INST., CUTTING CORRECTLY: NEW PRISON 
POLICIES FOR TIMES OF FISCAL CRISIS 3 (2002). 
 117. For an excellent review of this research, see RYAN S. KING ET AL., THE SENTENCING 
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C.  The Mysteries of Recidivism  
But of course, no one argues that the sentencing system is the sole, or 
even necessarily the most important, component of criminal justice in 
preventing crime. Rather, we should identify the more particularized role 
that sentencing can play in reducing the crime rates of those released from 
prisons. And to narrow things more, let us eliminate the prospect of 
legislated prison terms as a mechanism of general deterrence. That means 
we are left with the phenomenon of imprisonment (and parole) in terms of 
specific deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation. Thus, we should 
focus on the more specific goal of reducing crime by recidivists. But this 
exercise only underscores the preliminary difficulty of determining what 
set of crimes is in fact recidivist, because we would first have to define the 
types and numbers of prior offenses, convictions, and incarcerations that 
help define the recidivism category.  
A first cut at this issue is to look at the published BJS statistics on 
comparative recidivism rates among the states according to the criterion 
used by the states and BJS—which turns out to be the number of 
judgments the states denominate as “parole violations” leading to re-
imprisonment. The 2007 BJS report allows us a quick look at these 
numbers, and amid their complexity and the diversity of systemic contexts 
for them, one very non-subtle thing stands out: California’s parole 
violation rate is the outlier among outliers. It is more than three times that 
of Texas, and is anomalous no matter how one adjusts for general 
population or even prison population.118 
However, it takes little analysis to realize how weak a basis for 
comparative assessment of recidivism these numbers provide. Even, or 
especially, with California, of course, the question of how many of its 
returnees should count as “recidivists” is a very complex matter of 
definition. The great majority of California returnees are people who were 
paroled under the formulaic mandatory parole system, not the old-
fashioned discretionary parole. Under that scheme, many inmates return to 
prison for minor parole violations that are not statutory crimes, while a 
great number commit new crimes that, for prosecutorial and administrative 
convenience, are classified as parole violations.119 
                                                                                                                     
PROJECT, INCARCERATION AND CRIME: A COMPLEX RELATIONSHIP 2–6 (2005), available at 
http://www.sentencingproject.org/Admin/Documents/publications/inc_iandc_complex.pdf. The 
authors note serious deficiencies in the statistical record needed to clarify the incarceration-crime 
relationship, including inconsistencies of definitions and measures across jurisdictions and differing 
time frames for analysis. Id. at 2–4. But, they also posit some reasons why marginal increases in 
incarceration might not reduce crime. For example, we would at least expect diminishing returns on 
crime reduction at some point if the highest rate offenders are captured first. Id. a  6. Also, 
especially with regard to drug crimes, incapacitation of one offender may simply invite a new 
substitute offender to replace him in a fixed-sum market of drug-dealing opportunities. Id. at 6. 
 118. WEST &  SABOL, supra note 102, at 17. 
 119. JOAN PETERSILIA, CAL. POL’Y RESEARCH CTR., UNDERSTANDING CALIFORNIA CORRECTIONS 
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To appreciate the complexity of the recidivism measure, one can turn to 
James A. Wilson’s important recent study on a decade of data from the 
state of Tennessee.120 Wilson demonstrates in this one jurisdiction how 
arbitrary and contingent the definition of a parole violation is, and not just 
in terms of whether it is itself a new crime.121 The official criteria for 
revocability changed during the study period, as did the degree of tolerance 
exercised by parole officers in applying those criteria, and, concomitantly, 
the degree of supervision they exercise on parolees.122 When Wilson 
examined changes in the parole release and revocation patterns, he found 
no clear correlations with any demographic criteria or severity of crime or 
conviction.123 Rather, the main predictor of the number of parole 
revocations turned out to be the original number of parole releases.124 And, 
Wilson tentatively concludes that  major, if not the major, predictor of the 
parole release rate is the population pressure on the prison system—the 
ratio of those sitting in jail awaiting assignment to prison to the number of 
those currently in prison.125 And then there is the paradox—perhaps not a 
very bizarre one, on reflection—that increases in parole releases lead to 
increases in parole revocations even where the increase in parole releases 
was originally implemented in order to relieve population pressure.126  
In a response essay, Sheila Royo Maxwell further unravels the 
heterogeneous category of recidivism, as she enumerates the variety of 
legal and political vectors that determine revocation.127 Greater supervision 
may increase revocations because of more stringent discipline of parolees, 
but relaxed supervision may have the same effect to the extent that 
foregone supervision might have prevented revocations.128 In a related 
essay, Joel Wallman notes, with strong implications for California, that the 
complexity of analysis would increase further if we tried to sort out these 
numbers in terms of whether the original release was mandatory or 
discretionary under state law.129 
But we may consider one more possible set of measurements of 
recidivism having to do with ratios of various inputs and outputs to prison 
systems. 
                                                                                                                     
71–73 (2006), available at http://www.ucop.edu/cprc/documents/understand_ca_corrections.pdf. 
 120. James A. Wilson, Bad Behavior or Bad Policy? An Examination of Tennessee Release 
Cohorts, 1993–2001, 4 CRIMINOLOGY &  PUB. POL’Y 485, 485 (2005). 
 121. Id. at 494–95. 
 122. Id. at 504. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 505. 
 125. Id. at 507. 
 126. Id. at 509. 
 127. Shelia Royo Maxwell, Rethinking the Broad Sweep of Recidivism: A Task for Evaluators, 
4 CRIMINOLOGY &  PUB. POL’Y 519, 519 (2005). 
128. See Anne Morrison Piehl & Stefan F. LoBuglio, Does Supervision Matter?, in PRISONER 
REENTRY AND CRIME IN AMERICA 105, 108–09 (Jeremy Travis & Christy Visher eds., 2005). 
 129. Joel Wallman, Unpacking Recidivism, 4 CRIMINOLOGY &  PUB. POL’Y 479, 481–82 (2005). 
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The first possible measure is the ratio of new court commitments to 
parole violators. Crudely put, this can be seen as a comparison between the 
crime prevention success of the criminal justice or law enforcement system 
generally and the performance of the prisons. In terms of the relative 
performance of the prison system, the higher the ratio, the better the 
performance. 
If we semi-randomly take eight states from the 2007 BJS report, the 
numbers for the eight states are: Pennsylvania—1.77; Michigan—2.13; 
Ohio—6.99; Alabama—6.44; Texas—1.70; California—0.51, Georgia—
1.37; New York—1.69. Ohio’s “good” outlier status may be due to very 
restrictive parole rights there, but there is nothing subtle, yet again, about 
California’s opposite outlier status. 
The second possible measure is the ratio of prisoner releases to parole 
violators returned. This might seem to be closer to an internal review of the 
recidivism-reducing powers of the prison, one at least worth observing 
over time. Here, the numbers for the same states are: Pennsylvania—2.84; 
Michigan—3.59; Ohio—7.64; Alabama—7.72; Texas—2.79; California—
1.47, Georgia—2.15; New York—2.78. Again, “congratulations” to 
California, although no glory goes to Georgia. 
The third possible measure is the ratio of conditional releases to parole 
violators returned. This might show how well the system is choosing 
whom to release or how well it is supervising those on whom it took a 
chance. Here, the numbers are: Pennsylvania—1.95; Michigan—3.04; 
Ohio—3.99; Alabama—4.82; Texas—2.12; California—1.44, Georgia—
0.39; New York—2.44. Georgia clearly merits some scrutiny. 
Finally, the fourth possible measure is the ratio of unconditional 
releases from prison to parole violators returned. Might the numbers on 
this scale show that some states are abject failures? Or that conditional 
release may be a good idea after all? Here, the numbers are: 
Pennsylvania—0.54; Michigan—0.42; Ohio—3.61; Alabama—2.79; 
Texas—0.53; California—0.02; Georgia—1.75; New York—0.31. The 
extreme crudity of these numbers means that they may tell us nothing 
across states. California’s numbers simply tell us that there is little 
unconditional release. But again, tracking a state over time may prove 
helpful. 
Either way, recidivism is a double target as a success measure: It 
invokes our sense of tragedy because it is so unknowable, yet it is tragic 
because if we did learn something measurable, it might be that prison does 
not rehabilitate in the sense of making people less crime-prone then they 
were when they entered. The crime-inducing effects of prison may be built 
into our society. But prisons may at least differ in the degree to which they 
mitigate their own damage. 
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D.  Disparity Reduction 
An unequivocal goal of the MPCS is to reduce unwarranted disparity in 
sentencing outcomes, especially when that disparity has racial or ethnic 
implications.130 Since the turn of the new century, the percentage of 
American prisoners who are African-American has declined, and the 
Black-White ratio has declined from 8:1 to 7:1.131 This is not the place to 
take on the infinitely complex issue of the role and manifestation of race in 
the criminal justice system, but it is worth noting that for many, this 
reduction, however small, is an incontestable good. Still more modestly, it 
is a (roughly) measurable matter and will support claims of success or 
failure by many chosen standards rooted in various political philosophies. 
On the other hand, from 2000 to 2007, the percentage of prisoners who 
are Latino increased from 18.2% to 19.7%, but the rate of imprisonment 
per population for Latinos went down from 1,419 per 100,000 to 1,259.132 
So the increase in the percentage of prisoners who were Latino seems to be 
the effect of the increase of the percentage of Latinos in the general 
population. 
Of course, disparity-reducing effects can be measured in part by 
whatever analytic schemes are normally used to tease out impermissible 
factors, especially race and ethnicity, from those factors that could 
legitimately affect sentencing. In important new research, Professor John 
Pfaff has inferred that both presumptive and voluntary guidelines systems 
have decreased sentencing disparities for those convicted of a particular 
offense and also have reduced the statistically measurable role of race or 
gender in sentencing.133 Professor Pfaff carefully acknowledges that by this 
definition, reduction in disparity is not an uncontestable virtue because it 
may allow less individuation for offender characteristics than normatively 
preferable.134 But if we accept the widespread lament that the pre-
guidelines systems exhibited irrational or prejudicial disparity, the changes 
Professor Pfaff observes do not look very normatively contestable after all. 
 
 
                                                                                                                     
 130. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING REPORT § (b)(iii)–(vi) (Preliminary Draft No. 6, 2008).  
 131. WEST &  SABOL, supra note 102, at 4. 
 132. Id. 
 133. John F. Pfaff, The Vitality of Voluntary Guidelines in the Wake of Blakely v. Washington: 
An Empirical Assessment, 19 FED. SENT’G REP. 202, 202–03 (2007); John F. Pfaff, The Continued 
Vitality of Structured Sentencing Following Blakely: The Effectiveness of Voluntary Guidelines, 54 
UCLA L. REV. 235, 235 (2006) [hereinafter Pfaff, Continued Vitality]. 
 134. Pfaff, Continued Vitality, supra note 133, at 281. Perhaps too carefully, he allows for the 
possibility that gender neutrality also may be a contestable virtue, since sentencers might want to 
mitigate to parents who are especially crucial to their children’s care and who, he says, may be 
disproportionately female. Id. at 281–82. 
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E.  Showing Us the Money 
Even if we settled on normative goals for our sentencing system, we 
would have to recognize that sentencing is just one component of criminal 
justice and even a smaller component of government. Thus, the question of 
resource allocation is unavoidable, and therefore equally unavoidable are 
complex measures of efficiency in reducing crime or whatever the goal 
may be. The MPCS, especially through its promotion of the commission 
model, is clearly committed to cost-efficacy as a component of reform, and 
in any event, political resistance to adoption of the MPCS is likely to raise 
cost issues—legitimately or not. Finessing for the moment the impossible 
question of what success outcome we are trying to achieve as cheaply as 
possible, the cost-efficacy of a system, in turn, might be captured by any 
number of possible metrics—i.e., a measurement of reduced cost per 
prisoner or some other unit, or some measure of the cost per unit of 
reduction in recidivism, or some measure of the relationship between 
prison expenditures and the crime rate (although we may expect a notable 
lag between cause and effect in this linkage), or some measure of the 
relationship between overall prison expenditures and the recidivism rate 
(where we might expect less of a lag, since any effect of the prison 
experience on recidivism is likely to show up right after release). These 
measures are all individually complex and in turn, any one of them will 
bear only an elusive relationship to incarceration rates. More modest 
measures would include some combination of reduced prison costs as a 
portion of the state budget and the absence of any disturbing increase in the 
crime rate or recidivism rate.135 
 
                                                                                                                     
135. A good example of the difficulty of success measurement is privatization research, which 
aims to determine whether private prison contractors can incarcerate more efficiently than the public 
system. See Kathryne TafollaYoung, Note, The Privatization of California Correctional Facilities: 
A Population-Based Approach, 18 STAN. L. &  POL’Y REV. 438, 438–39 (2007). Analyzing the 
relative efficacy of private and public systems is daunting even if we have good data, because 
determining the right frames to sort the data is such a contestable enterprise. Id. at 439. For 
example, in the world of privatization, we often distinguish “avoidable” costs, those that can be 
imposed on the contractor, from “unavoidable” ones, those that the state must continue to bear. 
However, drawing the boundary between the two is a complex matter that will obviously influence 
the measure of the contractors’ success. Id. at 439. In addition, if we look at efficacy in terms of 
cost per prisoner housed, we would have to control for the varying categories of prisoners housed in 
private facilities. Id. at 440. If the contactors get the less dangerous inmates, the apparent success 
advantages will suffer from severe sampling biases. Id. at 447–54. If they get older prisoners, their 
security costs will go down but their medical costs will go up, with the relative effects being wildly 
unpredictable. Id. Further, cross-vendor and cross-state comparisons are difficult because some 
contractors subject themselves to the industry-standard criteria of the American Correctional 
Association but others do not. Id. at 464–65. Moreover, if vendors follow the common public model 
of using remote rural locations for facilities, the lower land and related costs might seem to improve 
efficacy, but these savings will be at the cost of greater access to reentry programs and social 
services in more urban areas. Id. at 465–66. 
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The vast question of measuring cost becomes even vaster when we set 
it in the context of modern styles of prison financing—and such styles have 
gotten more creative precisely when, and as a result of, the crowding crises 
now facing the United States.136 Until the 1980s, most prison construction 
was financed either immediately though draws on general revenue or 
through general revenue bonds on a longer term.137 These general revenue 
bonds were highly marketable, because they were backed by the full faith 
and credit of the state.138 But since then, the states have mostly (and, in the 
last decade, entirely) financed prison space through lease or revenue bonds 
which are payable out of specified assets or income streams and that are 
sometimes defeasible by the legislature.139 This modern form of “back-
door” financing is an attractive political choice for legislatures, but 
regardless of its political or economic feasibility, it makes the whole notion 
of measuring cost-effectiveness even more daunting. This is because the 
actual or threatened failure of such bonds can have metastatic effects on 
the creditworthiness of the state in general, so costing out the liability the 
state takes on is highly speculative. Indeed, the financing has now become 
triangulated between the state, the creditor entities, and third-party private 
entities that build or help operate prisons.140 Under many creative financing 
arrangements, third-party vendors play a big and sometimes conflicted role 
in the state’s efforts to get financing. And sometimes the financial interests 
of the third-party lead the state to build a bigger facility than it otherwise 
needs, often with the expectation that the federal correctional system will 
rent back some of the space. Whether the result of all this leads to a melt-
downable speculative bubble is an intriguing question these days, but in the 
short run it is clear that this new era of financing makes the cost-efficacy of 
prisons a great mystery. 
In any event, those who promote the MPCS to state legislatures will 
clearly need to be prepared to discuss these financial factors, and equally 
important, future critiques of adopted MPCS schemes will surely include 
concerns about whether its deontological and non-financial utilitarian 
benefits are worth the cost. 
F.  Some Political or Civic “Measures” 
Finally, consider some “soft factors” that, in an ironic but helpful way, 
are easy to measure empirically. These are “measures” of civic satisfaction 
that manifest themselves in superficial but therefore transparent ways.  
                                                                                                                     
 136. Kevin Pranis, Doing Borrowed Time: The High Cost of Back-Door Prison Finance, 
PRISON LEGAL NEWS, Nov. 2008, at 1, 1. The following discussion above is drawn from this superb 
article. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 1, 3. 
 140. Id. at 3–4. 
27
Weisberg: Tragedy, Skepticism, Empirics, and the MPCS
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2009
824 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61 
 
One is “transparency”—a vague, contestable term, but one with much 
political salience. In the category of transparency, there is the much-
invoked goal of reform called “Truth-in-Sentencing” (TIS).141 The MPCS 
does not invoke this popular shibboleth, and indeed its mild compromise 
on parole release would suggest that the MPCS would not fully satisfy the 
vocal adherents of TIS. But at some point, appraisers of the MPCS might 
well have to determine whether the MPCS model somewhat disserves the 
goal of transparency, and MPCS promoters need to be prepared to talk in 
transparency terms.  
A number of states now proclaim their success with respect to 
transparency through the very clear evidence of the TIS gap narrowing 
because of the elimination of discretionary parole or other under-the-radar 
release mechanisms.142 Of course, this is very disputable as both a goal and 
an indicator of success. On the one hand, TIS enhances general deterrence 
if certain assumptions are made about the extent to which potential 
offenders rely on fairly precise warnings of likely incarceration time. It 
may also help officials who manage prison population flows and costs. But 
there remains in our jurisprudence a very strong legacy of belief in the 
rehabilitative value of indeterminate sentencing. For that goal, TIS may be 
irrelevant. And still worse, if the old indeterminacy model was at least 
somewhat right (and the MPCS is somewhat wrong) about the tempting 
incentive of earlier release for inmates, TIS might even be an obstacle. 
Nevertheless, if we accept factual transparency, narrowly viewed, as an 
inherently good thing, then in that regard sentencing systems have an easy 
measure of success. 
Perhaps more constructively, though also very narrowly, another 
version of transparency would be captured by the forecasting protocols 
imagined by the MPCS. Any improvement, however incomplete or inexact, 
in the publicizing of the cost or likely demographic effects of any change in 
criminal law would seem to be a benefit. And here, the evidence-based and 
cost-efficacy measures incorporated by the MPCS may serve the MPCS 
well politically, however uncertain both the theory and the data are 
concerning these measures. 
Another version of transparency the MPCS indirectly endorses is any 
emphasis on so-called evidence-based risk assessments at all stages of 
prosecution and sentencing.143 If these are not only widely used but also 
                                                                                                                     
 141. See, e.g., Weisberg, supra note 114, at 221 (stating that TIS is a “much-invoked goal of 
reform” which is “the close tie between the sentence decreed in legislation or announced at trial and 
the sentence the offender actually serves”). 
 142. For a review of the claims of Virginia in this regard, see id. at 215–16. 
 143. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING, Reporter’s Introduction 21 (Preliminary Draft No. 6, 
2008). See generally Roger K. Warren, Evidence-Based Practices and State Sentencing Policy: Ten 
Policy Initiatives to Reduce Recidivism, 82 IND. L.J. 1307 (2007) (discussing how greater reliance 
on evidence-based practices would allow state courts to improve effectiveness of state sentencing 
outcomes and reduce recidivism while reducing over-reliance on incarceration and promoting use of 
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widely publicized, the public will have a better sense of how government 
decides whom to incarcerate, and this would also seem incontenstable as a 
contribution to civic understanding in relation to policymaking—in the 
abstract. But, alas, no benefit is unalloyed: Imagine that an effect of this 
admired form of risk-assessment, and the resulting redistribution of 
punishment toward the most violent and dangerous, would be that the 
prison population would become much younger—or take on some other 
distinct demographic cast. The pervasive social effects of recharacterizing 
the model prisoner as a young predator or as some other kind of iconic 
character may prove culturally troublesome. It might re-invoke images of 
criminals that sparked the harsh populism that much of sentencing reform 
has aimed to quell. 
VI.   A CONCLUDING OBSERVATION 
Regarding the dangers of populism for fair sentencing, let me end on a 
lighter note with the most absurdly modest of all measurements of success: 
duration and political quietude. By some very extreme version of “other-
things-being-unequalness,” we might consider the ability of any sentencing 
scheme, especially one created after the end of the indeterminate era, to 
endure without significant change or populist demands for change. The 
long-term endurance of a sentencing scheme might be a sign that the 
scheme has won popular acceptance—or, more modest yet, that it has not 
provoked the demagogic populism that has such wider insidious effects on 
criminal justice. As well, duration without change is surely easy to 
measure, without multiple regressions. As I have suggested, in its very 
partial and tentative nod in the direction of empirical assessment of 
sentencing reform, the MPCS partakes, at least implicitly, in the sober, 
somber recognition of how empirically unknowable the consequences of 
our law reform actions are. In finessing this issue, the MPCS rightly (again 
implicitly) accepts the second-best idea: we should do the right thing while 
imposing at least a modest burden of proof to establish that what we do, as 
measured however imperfectly by our best available social science, is 
consistent with our goals. That said, the biggest blows to criminal justice, 
in terms of both fairness and utility, often come from that very political 
demagoguery. Thus, once we accept that the MPCS is at least a very 
enlightened law reform, even if it is not universally preferred, its very 






                                                                                                                     
community-based alternatives for appropriate offenders). 
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 144. For derivation of all figures, see WEST &  SABOL, supra note 102, at 17. 
APPENDIX 
 





















Pennsylvania 1.77 2.84 1.95 0.54 
Michigan 2.13 3.59 3.04 0.42 
Ohio 6.99 7.64 3.99 3.61 
Alabama 6.44 7.72 4.82 2.79 
Texas 1.70 2.79 2.12 0.53 
California 0.51 1.47 1.44 0.02 
Georgia 1.37 2.15 0.39 1.75 
New York 1.69 2.78 2.44 0.31 
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